ILC session explicitly states, "the internal law of an international organization cannot be sharply differentiated from international law. At least the constituent instrument of the international organization is a treaty or another instrument governed by international law; some further parts of the internal law of the organization may be viewed as belonging to international law … Thus, the relations between international law and the internal law of an international organization appear too complex to be expressed in a general principle". 15 This complexity is 10 M Virally, L'organisation mondiale (Armand Colin, 1972) 30. (What is true in this double image, superimposing two seemingly antinomic images: the positive and the negative on the same sheet? Is it correct to say: the UN failed to prevent the six-day war in the Middle East? Is not this to yield to the temptation of nominalism? Are we not closer to the political reality saying that the states that exert an influence in the Middle East, starting with the superpowers, have not been able to prevent the war in the Middle East, using the means of action offered by the United Nations Charter?) 11 administrative rules and a group of external international rules; 25 the second relies on the differences between international organizations, limiting the capacity to produce internal norms only to those having a higher degree of integration, based primarily on the specificity of the European Union ('EU'). 26 These may be labelled 'hybrid' theories, insofar as they do not provide a comprehensive understanding that applies uniformly to each of the rules. The other two, developed on the basis of the distinction between original and derivative legal systems, 27 rely on a clear-cut dichotomy: either the rules are part of international law 28 or they merely constitute internal law. 
Hybrid Theories
Most scholars look at the rules with only a limited group of norms concerning the administrative function of the organization, or only the characteristics of certain organizations in mind.
30
Under the first theory, the distinction is usually drawn between internal and external rules. 31 However, there is not a clear-cut differentiation and every author almost arbitrarily decides where the internal rules stop and the external start. The distinction between internal and international law arising from the legal system of an international organization varies from the minimum internal core of employment relations 32 to the maximum internal core of Global Administrative Law.
33
It is useful to discuss the issue looking at an instrument of Global Administrative Law having the form of a rule of international organizations: for example, International Health 25 P Kazanski, 'Théorie de l'administration internationale ' (1902) 
Regulations.
34 They are a peculiar source of law arising from Articles 21 and 22 of the World Health Organization's ('WHO') Constitution with a rare binding force in order to face health crises. 35 The WHO Assembly adopts them with simple majority and they come into force for all member states after due notice and with the possibility of opting out within a short period.
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The question here is where the administrative function ends. Health regulations can be framed as external or internal instruments simply depending on the perspective. This ambiguity has relevant consequences, as the internal nature of the regulations may be submitted to the dispute settlement mechanism envisaged in Article 56 of the International Health Regulations, while their external nature may be submitted to the general rules of the responsibility of international organizations. The legal counsel of the World Health Organization affirmed that the rules might allow the development of a "customized internal legal order that could avoid legal controversies about rather minor issues". 37 The World Health Organization stated that the obligations arising directly from its constituent instrument are necessarily international obligations, save for staff regulations. 38 What is, then, the administrative function of an international organization? Following the first hybrid theory, the lawmaking process of international organizations can create something that is internal or administrative and something that is international. The distinction between internal and external rules drawn by some authors is useful insofar as it describes the qualities of the law produced by international organizations, 39 but it is not a normative description based on the legal nature of the rules. The theory that discusses the hybrid nature of the rules differentiating between internal sources is therefore not acceptable, since whatever comes from a rule of recognition must belong to the system of its origin. 40 If the World Health Organization develops a legal system, the entire body of law produced by the organization must respond to the same rule of recognition, be it 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).
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The topic is framed within the fragmentation of international law and self-contained regimes regulated by lex specialis. 46 Looking at the European Union, the absence of an ad hoc provision in the ILC project was mitigated by the role of the article on lex specialis, which allows the application of internal EU rules derogating from the draft articles. 47 The lex specialis provision is applicable to any organization, underlining the international nature of the rules, In summary, the hybrid-nature theory can be contested affirming that: 1) when a legal system is created it cannot produce two different kinds of law belonging to two different legal systems; and 2) when a legal system is created, it produces law, despite the characteristics of the system itself.
Comprehensive Theories
Not many legal scholars look at an international organization as a unique body of law. The doctrine lacks a study on this particular topic, and there is generally little understanding of the inclusiveness of the category of the rules. There is, however, a distinction between the ideas of international organizations built over a constitution or over a contract. 50 The constitutional view relies on the public dimension of international institutions, while the contractual view is based on the analogy with private national enterprises. 51 The first perspective looks at the rules as internal law, the second as international law.
In the development of a theory based on the internal nature of the rules it is possible to recognize a slow descent toward its extreme consequences. Initially, the nature of the rules was devoid of much scholarly attention, and so was their definition; commentators focused more on autonomy and legal personality. distinction between internal and external functions, relying on the internal nature of the external functions. 54 At that point the path diverges, towards an hybrid nature on the one side or a coherent internal nature on the other. 55 In 2011, Christiane Ahlborn brought the internal nature of the rules to their extreme and necessary consequences, contesting their lex specialis relation with international law. 56 Since the rules belong to a different legal system, they are not lex specialis in relation to international law and therefore Article 64 of the ARIO should be expunged. It is through the relationship between internal lex specialis and international lex generalis that the limits of the exclusively internal nature of the rules becomes evident, since it is unable to acknowledge their inherent belonging to international law.
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The exclusively internal character of the rules of international organizations is unable to recognize the international self-contained nature of the legal systems of international organizations. 58 This deficiency has been perfectly described in the context of the World Trade
Organization ('WTO') by Joost Pauwelyn. 59 His monograph is devoted to demonstrating that WTO law is part of international law. He describes the relationship between the internal and the international dimensions of the organization using the tools provided by the law of treaties and stressing the existence of two inherent tensions between the fall-back to and the contract out of international law. The degree of permeability between the two systems does not allow an absolute internal nature of the rules.
Concerning the last theory, the international nature of the rules has its limits too. The international nature is strictly related to functionalism. Jan Klabbers defines functionalism as "essentially a principal-agent theory, with a collective principal (the member states) assigning one or more specific tasks-functions-to their agent". 67 Functionalism affects the nature of the rules imposing a rigid international nature, under which the agent exercises his functions in the framework of the same legal system in which the 'master' delegated his power. 68 As Klabbers contests, this is not compatible with empirical phenomena that underline the wide autonomy of international organizations. Functionalism cannot explain the development of an independent legal system and consequently the internal nature of its rules. The traditional support for functionalist theories brought a number of scholars to imply the international nature, even if most of the times this stance is not clearly acknowledged. 
A Venture into Legal Theory
This section deviates from the usual framework of the discourse on international organizations.
It will merge issues arising from the existence of transnational regimes with the traditional debate on well-established subjects of international law.
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The common denominator is analytical jurisprudence, seen as an attempt to provide an answer to the questions of what law and a legal system are, and how such a system must be organized in its internal and external dimensions. 74 The intention here is to make "an effort to understand the nature of a social institution and its products". 75 Therefore, the legal nature of the rules will be framed according to two lines: first, the The existence of original and derivative legal systems is related to what Santi Romano calls 'presupposition', which is the existence of a legal system founded over a preexisting legal system. 84 For Santi Romano, this is the relationship between states and international law, since states presuppose the international society. This example shows that Santi Romano's 'presupposition' is based on the importance of the founders of a legal system. The supporters of the derived nature of international organizations follow the idea. 85 However, looking at individuals can challenge this thesis. They should be the only presupposition of any legal system. This is a problem of subjects, and does not concern the source of its creation. Moving from his theory, it is affirmed here that presupposition is not based on the preexistence of the founder subjects, but on the formalistic creation of an order over sources of law of the 77 Schultz, above n 73, 10-11. 78 Sereni, above n 29. 79 Decleva, above n 28. 80 S Romano, L'ordinamento giuridico (Pisa, 1917 The legal system of international organizations is founded over a source of international law; member states are at the same time subjects of international law and of the organization.
The two orders are not in a relationship of equality or independence, since one is the presupposition of the other.
When a derivative legal system is created, how is it affected by the preexisting system?
How does international law influence international organizations? Can an organization abandon its derivative character founding an original legal system with an internal act of will?
Can the validity of a rule of the organization be subjected to international law? Can international law impose its external effects on international organizations? What are the external effects between organizations?
The second theme to discuss is the relevance of the point of view.
Relative and Absolute Legality of the Rules
Relevance can adopt different points of view: "order A may be relevant for B but not for C, while both B and C may be irrelevant for A". 86 The first distinction to be made is between the importance of the assertion that the legality of a system depends on its recognition by others legal systems and the so-called "absolute legality" of the legal system recognized by an external observer.
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The relative legality of a norm is what a legal system perceives through its own rules of recognition. It could consist in the recognition of a norm as its own law, or it could consist in the recognition of a norm as part of a different legal system. It is still an internal point of view.
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When a legal system applies a norm recognizing its belonging to another legal system it reproduces the content of the norm inside its own system despite the internal point of view of the system that created that norm, and despite the absolute legality of that legal system.
An external observer attributes the absolute legality of a norm. The observer must be external to any legal system in order to maintain an analytical and descriptive position. He does not accept the rule of recognition of the system under study. 89 This prompts us to consider two different points of view from which legal phenomena may be apprehended. 90 The internal perspective means to adhere to the discourse that institutions use about themselves, while the external perspective supposes an epistemological break.
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As to the rules of international organizations, distinguishing between different perspectives of legality is fundamental: indeed, it is a consequence of the fact that the point of view could change the nature of the rule. If the actors of the international legal system, through its lawmaking mechanism, say that Security Council resolutions are international law, they become law of this system under its perspective. If the actors of the organization legal system, through its lawmaking mechanism, say that Security Council resolutions are internal law, they became law of that system. In both cases, this happens despite the absolute nature of the rules. On the one hand, a radical internal point of view is adopted when a subject of the international legal system looks at the rules of international organizations as international law.
Even considering the existence of a different legal system, the subject of international law defines the rule of the organization as its own law, despite the internal point of view of the organization. This is what happens when a state (wearing the clothes of a subject of the international legal system) considers a resolution of the Security Council.
On the other hand, the same radical internal point of view is adopted when a subject of the organization's legal system considers a rule merely internal law. This is what happens when a state (wearing the clothes of a subject of the organization's legal system) considers a regulation of the European Union.
It is affirmed here that absolute legality, defined as "something descriptively attributed to a normative system by an observer" 97 must be an external point of view adopted taking into consideration the internal point of view, without adopting it and applying what for Ost and Kerchove would be a moderate external point of view.
In order to define absolute legality, it is necessary to look at the interaction between legal systems. Absolute legality is an attempt to recognize the plurality of points of view, and it can succeed in looking at the formal interaction between legal systems, which, in case of international organizations, is a relationship based on presupposition from international law.
The Dual Legality of the Rules
The absolute legality of the rules of international organizations is a combination of the derivative character of the legal system that produces them (the external 'absolute' point of view) and the legal system that looks at the rules (the internal 'absolute' point of view that depends on the system of reference).
The conclusion is that the rules of international organizations serve as law for two different legal systems. They have, in other words, a dual nature. This is something different from recognizing the effects of the Midas principle, where each legal system has the power to reproduce the content of an external rule. In fact, Midas creates two rules, with more or less the same content (but not necessarily, as a system may misrepresent a rule of another system).
Dual legality, instead, shares the same rule; it is only the point of view that changes. The international nature has to be assessed looking at the quality of its author (the UNSC) while the internal nature looking at the nature of the act itself. A last example concerns the existence of the so-called objective regimes, treaties that produce obligations for non-parties. 110 Again, at the core of the problem there is the tension between two poles: collective interest and contractualism. 111 
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In order to introduce a framework under which try to understand and resolve the 'ambiguities of the institutional action', the paper will focus on three distinct-but interrelated-issues. (This fundamental duality produces some ambiguity in the institutional action: it is autonomous, since it develops according to its own law and according to the decisions taken by the organs of the institution; but it is not independent, since it is guided by forces that are exercised within the institution, but with which it is not confused. Thus the institution always appears as a mask, covering something other than itself. However, the ambiguity is dissipated when the mask is lifted and the inner-self is revealed.) 115 Brölmann, above n 19. of a rule may also recall responsibility; responsibility may also derive from the breach of a treaty obligation.
The Law of Treaties and the Dual Legality of the Rules
Scholars today do not hesitate to recognize that international organizations have the capacity to conclude treaties. However, the origin of this prerogative and the relationship with the attributed competences are still not clear. 118 Article 6 of the 1986 Vienna Convention states:
"The capacity of an international organization to conclude treaties is governed by the relevant rules of that organization". does capacity derive solely from the rules of particular organizations?" 123 The discussion is divided between the objective existence of international organizations, where the capacity is inherent to the organization, 124 and the will of member states, which have drawn up the constitutive instrument. 125 Article 6 is an attempt to be consistent with both views and it is based on the definition of the rules of the organization. 126 The dual legality is at the origin of the transparent institutional veil of the organization and it can explain the position of member states under a treaty signed by an organization. 127 This was one of the most debated issues faced by the ILC and by the 1986 Vienna Conference:
are member states third parties to an agreement concluded by the organization or do they assume rights and obligations? 128 The troubled history of Article 36bis of the 1986 Vienna Convention explains the difficulties of the question. 129 Special Rapporteur Reuter identified two different situations in which an agreement may give rise to direct rights and obligations to member states: when the constitutive instrument envisages it or when the internal distribution of competences will produce that effect. 130 Reuter's proposal moves from the idea of the rules as international law, where third states, concluding an agreement with the organization, are de facto contracting with its member states. After the criticism expressed by the Commission, the between two or more international organizations ' [1975] II(1) Yearbook of the International Law Commission: 1. A treaty concluded by an international organization gives rise directly for states that are members of an international organization to rights and obligations in respect of other parties to that treaty if the constituent instrument of that organization expressly gives such effects to the treaty. 2. When, on account of the subject-matter of a treaty concluded by an international organization and the assignment of areas of competence involved in that subject-matter between the organization and its member states, it appears that such was indeed the intention of the parties to that treaty, the treaty gives rise for a member State to: (i) rights, which the member State is presumed to accept, in the absence of any indication of intention to the contrary; (ii) obligations when the member State accepts them, even implicitly.
new proposal is more consistent with an internal nature. The debates around this second proposal concerned whether the provision had a general character or it applied only in the case of the European Union. 132 The provision included in the draft articles of the ILC is again different: there is not a direct involvement of member states, which instead hide behind the organization. 133 Here, the internal nature is fully represented and third parties to the agreement assume rights and obligations only with their consent even if they are members of the organization.
The final outcome at the 1986 Vienna Conference was the deletion of the provision, Obligations and rights arise for States members of an international organization from the provisions of a treaty to which that organization is a party when the parties to the treaty intend those provisions to be the means of establishing such obligations and according such rights and have defined their conditions and effects in the treaty or have otherwise agreed thereon, and if: (a) the States members of the organization, by virtue of the constituent instrument of that organization or otherwise, have unanimously agreed to be bound by the said provisions of the treaty; and (b) the assent of the States members of the organization to be bound by the relevant provisions of the treaty has been duly brought to the knowledge of the negotiating States and the negotiating organizations". 134 Gaja, above n 121. 135 E Lagrange, La représentation institutionnelle dans l'ordre international: une contribution à la théorie de la personnalité morale des organisations internationales (Brill, 2002) 428. idea that organizations are bound by obligations binding member states. 136 The direct involvement of member states is not a feasible path, since it underlines only the international nature of the rules, in a sort of representation of states made by the organization. The theory does not recognize the autonomy of the organization and the internal nature of the rules.
However, member states are not only third parties to the agreements concluded by the organization. Often, the decision to conclude a treaty is taken unanimously by member states and it derives from the sum of their will. Often, international organizations conclude treaties with third parties in order to confer rights to their member states. In this case, they may even confer rights and exclude obligations, as in the case of fishing agreements concluded by the European Union. 137 Indeed, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea recently found that EU member states are not responsible for the conduct of the vessels flying their flag since they are not parties to fishing agreements concluded only by the European Union under its exclusive competence.
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The dual legality of the rules may help in considering the indirect position of member states, which are neither parties nor third parties, but still play a role in the treaty concluded by the organization. The legal concept that seems to best represent the position of member states is subsidiarity, which has first found recognition in the context of international responsibility.
The Responsibility of International Organizations and the Dual Legality of the
Rules
The dual legality of the rules is consistent with most of the fundamental decisions taken by the ILC in drafting the project on the international responsibility of international organizations.
Indeed, other scholars have already described how the Commission modified the nature of the rules throughout the project. 139 The double standard applied by the International Law
Commission is a symptom of the dual nature of the rules, and its acknowledgment helps to understand the nature of the responsibility of international organizations. 141 The dual legality challenges the last sentence, considering that breaches of obligations under the rules are violations of the law produced by the organization's legal system, which is peculiar, as it is at the same time internal and international.
One of the most relevant themes dealing with the transparent institutional veil of international organizations is the attribution of conduct and responsibility. consequences, and the present paper can propose a preliminary study only.
In order to attribute the conduct or the responsibility to an international organization, the ILC provides two main mechanisms. 143 The first relies on the institutional link based on the internal relationship between the organization and the subject that materially commits the illicit act. The main provision is enshrined in Article 6 of the ARIO, concerning the conduct of the organization's organ or agent. 144 The second one relies on the factual link based on the external relationship between the organization and the subject who materially commit the illicit act. The 1. The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that organization under international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization. 2. The rules of the organization apply in the determination of the functions of its organs and agents. authority and control of the UN is able to create the famous chain of command described in paragraph 135. 150 The United Nations Mission in Kosovo is a subsidiary organ of United Nations and its internal UN status allows member states to hide behind the institutional veil of the organization. 
Conversely, the ECtHR in
The Validity of the Rules of International Organizations and Their Dual Legality
The validity of the rules is the last topic that this paper will address. 155 Again, this paper will only introduce the opportunity to look at the issue from the perspective of the nature of the rules. The issue comes with a number of fundamental questions that can be divided in three main categories: the parameters of the validity (which is the legal system of reference?); the subjects with the power to claim invalidity (who is the ultimate judge over the acts of the organization?) and the consequences of invalidity (between ex tunc and ex nunc effects).
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This section will focus on the first question only. It will discuss the formal validity of norms starting from a positivist perspective. 157 The formal validity is related to a norm belonging to a legal system of reference, and it is based on the respect of the parameters imposed by that system. It follows the principle of hierarchy, under which the inferior norm must be in accordance with the superior.
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Concerning the rules of international organizations, the concept of validity interferes with the concept of ultra vires acts. 159 The notion of ultra vires refers to acts of an international organization taken beyond its competences, which causes their invalidity. Again, the issue is divided between the dichotomy of competence and capacity.
In the few cases in which the International Court of Justice was called to assess the validity of a rule, it always struggled to find a balance between the two faces of international 153 ARIO art 40(2): 2. The members of a responsible international organization shall take all the appropriate measures that may be required by the rules of the organization in order to enable the organization to fulfil its obligations under this Chapter. 154 organizations. When the Court recognizes the validity of a rule, it does so looking at the internal legal system of the organization and to its autonomy from member states. 160 For example, in the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, the Court looked at the purposes of the United Nations: "such expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purpose of the United Nations in the sense that if an expenditure were made for a purpose which is not one of the purposes of the United Nations, it could not be considered an 'expense of the Organization'".
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Conversely, when the Court recognizes the invalidity of a rule, it does so looking at the international nature of the rule and to its functionalist origin limited by the competences given by member states. 162 For example, in Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the Court interpreted the WHO Constitution using the tools provided by the law of treaties and applying a strict functionalism approach:
The Court need hardly point out that international organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence.
International organizations are governed by the 'principle of speciality', that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. 
Conclusion
This paper argued that every rule of every international organization must share the same nature, without indulging in theories that rely on different degrees of legality. Using tools provided by analytical jurisprudence, the nature of the rules has been described as harmonizing an internal and an international nature. The dual legality of the rules has been compared with some questions arising from the law of treaties, international responsibility and invalidity for ultra vires acts, in order to provide a theory that could harmonize the two faces of international Different regimes or different international organizations may rely on the complex institutional nature in order to achieve the desired outcome, wherever it means to exclude responsibility or demonstrate the validity of acts. This is evident in the context of UN Security
Council anti-terrorist resolutions. The United Nations may adopt different institutional veils in order to achieve different outcomes. 178 On the one hand, if resolutions are purely international law, it is difficult to sustain that the UN is bound by human rights obligations, even considering its lack of capacity to possess jurisdiction. 179 On the other hand, if resolutions are purely internal law, it is difficult to sustain that individuals possess legal personality within the particular UN legal system, even considering that invalidity may encounter only internal criteria.
The dual legality of the rules is an attempt to acknowledge the transparency of the institutional veil excluding the existence of different degrees. The autonomy possessed by international organizations does not allow states to disappear behind the organization and their indirect role should find a proper legal concept.
